Coderefercoderefer
CoursesWebinarsBlogAbout
Coderefercoderefer

Discover. Learn. Automate. Grow.

Learn

  • Courses
  • Webinars
  • Blog
  • Search

Company

  • About
  • Contact
  • FAQ

Legal

  • Privacy Policy
  • Terms of Service
  • Refund Policy
© 2026 Coderefer. All rights reserved.
HomeBlogLovable Apps Leaked Passports and 200K Messages: Check Your Supabase RLS in 10 Minutes
ai-toolsNovember 15, 20266 min read

Lovable Apps Leaked Passports and 200K Messages: Check Your Supabase RLS in 10 Minutes

Researchers found 24,664 Lovable apps leaking passports, payments, and 200K+ chat messages via open Supabase databases. Here's the 10-minute RLS check.

V

Vamsi Tallapudi

Manager, Architect Technology at Cognizant

Lovable Apps Leaked Passports and 200K Messages: Check Your Supabase RLS in 10 Minutes

Researchers at the German security firm Crissy Field scanned 159,041 live Lovable projects and found that 24,664 of them were returning database records to anyone who asked, no login required. Among the data sitting in the open: passport numbers with expiration dates, payment details, phone numbers, business contracts, and more than 200,000 private chat messages. The cause wasn't a hack. It was Supabase's Row-Level Security (RLS) either turned off or configured wrong, and it's checkable from your own dashboard in about 10 minutes.

If you've shipped anything with Lovable, Bolt, Base44, or any other AI app builder that defaults to Supabase, this is worth stopping to check today, not after you read the rest of this.

What did researchers actually find in the Lovable apps?

Crissy Field pulled 159,041 Lovable project URLs out of the Common Crawl archive, covering sites published between December 2025 and September 2026. Of those, 34,545 used Supabase as their backend, and 24,664 of those sites handed back database records the instant a browser (or a script) asked for them.

No password. No session. Just a GET request against the public Supabase Data API.

Here's what turned up once they looked closer:

  • 7,403 sites exposed tables containing email addresses, spread across 10,560 tables
  • 200,000+ chat messages, including internal WhatsApp logs, readable without authentication
  • 1,000+ identity records with passport numbers, expiration dates, and nationalities
  • Payment information, ticket codes, phone numbers, and home addresses
  • Business contracts, invoices, and personal photo albums
  • One single exposed table held 280,000 customer email addresses

One case stood out: a German lifestyle forum had leaked more than 80,000 user profiles plus over 200,000 chat messages, all sitting behind a Lovable-built front end that looked completely normal to visitors.

Why does a "no-code" app leak passports?

Lovable, like Bolt and Base44, generates apps that talk to Supabase directly from the browser using a public "anon" key. That key is supposed to be public. Supabase designed it that way. The thing that's supposed to stop a stranger from reading every row in your database is Row-Level Security, a set of Postgres policies that decide who can see what.

RLS has to be turned on, and the policies have to actually match your app's logic. Skip either step and the anon key becomes a skeleton key. An AI agent generating a working CRUD app under time pressure doesn't reliably remember to lock that door, and until recently, Supabase didn't force the issue either: new tables got full read/write access for every role by default unless you went and changed it.

That default changed on October 30, 2026. Supabase stopped auto-exposing new tables to its Data API; a table now needs an explicit grant before client code can touch it. Supabase announced the change back in April, made it the default for new projects in May, and rolled it out to every existing project by October 30. It's a real fix, but it only protects tables created after that date. Anything that existed before keeps its old, wide-open grants.

Is this the first time this has happened?

No, and that's the part that should worry you more than the passport numbers. This is the third documented wave in under two years:

WhenWho found itScope
May 2025Security researcher Matt Palmer, CVE-2025-48757170 of 1,645 scanned Lovable apps leaking data via missing RLS
May 2026WIRED, with research firm RedAccess~380,000 public apps across Lovable, Base44, Replit, and Netlify; ~5,000 exposed sensitive corporate data
November 2026Crissy Field24,664 of 34,545 Supabase-backed Lovable apps leaking records, including 1,000+ passports

Palmer's original disclosure in 2025 found the exact same root cause: RLS missing or misconfigured. He also said Lovable's response (a "security scanner" that flags whether RLS exists at all, without checking whether the policy is correct) gives people false confidence. Crissy Field's November findings suggest that scanner still isn't catching the real problem a year and a half later.

Lovable's head of security, Igor Andriushchenko, told press that this is an industry-wide Supabase configuration issue, not something unique to Lovable. He's not wrong that Base44 and Bolt apps show the same pattern. But "everyone's databases are open" isn't exactly reassuring if yours is one of them.

How do you check your own Supabase RLS in 10 minutes?

You don't need to wait for a researcher to email you. Run this yourself.

1. Check which tables have RLS enabled at all. Open the Supabase SQL editor and run:

select tablename, rowsecurity
from pg_tables
where schemaname = 'public';

Any row showing rowsecurity = false is a table your public anon key can read or write with zero restrictions. That's step one, and for a lot of vibe-coded apps, it's the whole problem.

2. Don't stop at "RLS is on." Enabling RLS with no policies attached locks a table down completely, which breaks your app. So a lot of Lovable-generated code adds a policy just to make things work again. If that policy reads USING (true) for the anon role, you've re-opened the door you just closed. Check the actual policy logic in Database > Policies, not just whether a policy exists.

3. Test it like an attacker would. Grab your anon key from the browser network tab (it's meant to be public, that part's fine) and hit your REST endpoint directly with curl, logged out:

curl 'https://YOUR_PROJECT.supabase.co/rest/v1/your_table?select=*' \
  -H 'apikey: YOUR_ANON_KEY'

If you get back rows that aren't yours, you have the exact issue Crissy Field documented.

4. Check storage buckets separately. RLS policies on tables don't cover Supabase Storage. Public buckets holding ID scans, invoices, or uploaded photos have shown up in earlier Lovable incidents too, and they need their own access rules.

5. For new projects, confirm the October 30 default is active. If your project predates that rollout, don't assume you're covered: check grants on every table you already shipped.

What should you actually do if you find exposed data?

Lock down the table immediately with a policy scoped to the authenticated user (auth.uid() = user_id is the standard pattern), then audit what was actually exposed and for how long. If the data includes anything regulated (passports, payment details, health info), you likely have a notification obligation depending on your jurisdiction, so don't just quietly patch it and move on.

This is the same instinct that matters whenever a tool defaults to "convenient" over "locked down": we've seen it with leaked local settings files and with credentials left in exposed configs after a breach. The fix is almost always the same: rotate what might be compromised, then go verify the default you trusted actually does what you assumed.

If you're shipping anything with a vibe-coding tool and you haven't opened your Supabase dashboard in the last month, today's the day. Ten minutes now beats being the next line item in somebody's research spreadsheet.

How to enable Row-Level Security in Supabase (2026 guide)
ai-tools supabase security vibe-coding 2026

Comments

    Get AI tricks that save you hours every week

    New AI tools, automation workflows, and course drops — straight to your inbox. Join 2,400+ builders.

    Read Next

    Expo Exact Explained: One App for Web, macOS, iOS and Linux
    ai-tools

    Expo Exact Explained: One App for Web, macOS, iOS and Linux

    Expo's new Exact framework runs one Contract app natively on web, macOS, iOS and Linux in a ~20KB runtime, built for AI coding agents to write, run and test it.

    November 15, 20267 min read
    How to Run Qwen3.8-27B Locally With llama.cpp 1.0
    ai-tools

    How to Run Qwen3.8-27B Locally With llama.cpp 1.0

    Run Qwen3.8-27B on your own GPU using llama.cpp's new v1.0.0 release and Unsloth's Dynamic v3.1 GGUFs, with exact commands and quant picks.

    November 15, 20265 min read
    Rust 1.100: The Never Type Is Finally Stable, Cargo Gets Dependency Cooldowns
    ai-tools

    Rust 1.100: The Never Type Is Finally Stable, Cargo Gets Dependency Cooldowns

    Rust 1.100 stabilizes the never type after 10 years and 5 attempts, and Cargo now supports dependency cooldowns to block fresh, potentially malicious crate versions.

    November 14, 20266 min read
    View all posts →