Researchers found 24,664 Lovable apps leaking passports, payments, and 200K+ chat messages via open Supabase databases. Here's the 10-minute RLS check.
Vamsi Tallapudi
Manager, Architect Technology at Cognizant
Researchers at the German security firm Crissy Field scanned 159,041 live Lovable projects and found that 24,664 of them were returning database records to anyone who asked, no login required. Among the data sitting in the open: passport numbers with expiration dates, payment details, phone numbers, business contracts, and more than 200,000 private chat messages. The cause wasn't a hack. It was Supabase's Row-Level Security (RLS) either turned off or configured wrong, and it's checkable from your own dashboard in about 10 minutes.
If you've shipped anything with Lovable, Bolt, Base44, or any other AI app builder that defaults to Supabase, this is worth stopping to check today, not after you read the rest of this.
Crissy Field pulled 159,041 Lovable project URLs out of the Common Crawl archive, covering sites published between December 2025 and September 2026. Of those, 34,545 used Supabase as their backend, and 24,664 of those sites handed back database records the instant a browser (or a script) asked for them.
No password. No session. Just a GET request against the public Supabase Data API.
Here's what turned up once they looked closer:
One case stood out: a German lifestyle forum had leaked more than 80,000 user profiles plus over 200,000 chat messages, all sitting behind a Lovable-built front end that looked completely normal to visitors.
Lovable, like Bolt and Base44, generates apps that talk to Supabase directly from the browser using a public "anon" key. That key is supposed to be public. Supabase designed it that way. The thing that's supposed to stop a stranger from reading every row in your database is Row-Level Security, a set of Postgres policies that decide who can see what.
RLS has to be turned on, and the policies have to actually match your app's logic. Skip either step and the anon key becomes a skeleton key. An AI agent generating a working CRUD app under time pressure doesn't reliably remember to lock that door, and until recently, Supabase didn't force the issue either: new tables got full read/write access for every role by default unless you went and changed it.
That default changed on October 30, 2026. Supabase stopped auto-exposing new tables to its Data API; a table now needs an explicit grant before client code can touch it. Supabase announced the change back in April, made it the default for new projects in May, and rolled it out to every existing project by October 30. It's a real fix, but it only protects tables created after that date. Anything that existed before keeps its old, wide-open grants.
No, and that's the part that should worry you more than the passport numbers. This is the third documented wave in under two years:
| When | Who found it | Scope |
|---|---|---|
| May 2025 | Security researcher Matt Palmer, CVE-2025-48757 | 170 of 1,645 scanned Lovable apps leaking data via missing RLS |
| May 2026 | WIRED, with research firm RedAccess | ~380,000 public apps across Lovable, Base44, Replit, and Netlify; ~5,000 exposed sensitive corporate data |
| November 2026 | Crissy Field | 24,664 of 34,545 Supabase-backed Lovable apps leaking records, including 1,000+ passports |
Palmer's original disclosure in 2025 found the exact same root cause: RLS missing or misconfigured. He also said Lovable's response (a "security scanner" that flags whether RLS exists at all, without checking whether the policy is correct) gives people false confidence. Crissy Field's November findings suggest that scanner still isn't catching the real problem a year and a half later.
Lovable's head of security, Igor Andriushchenko, told press that this is an industry-wide Supabase configuration issue, not something unique to Lovable. He's not wrong that Base44 and Bolt apps show the same pattern. But "everyone's databases are open" isn't exactly reassuring if yours is one of them.
You don't need to wait for a researcher to email you. Run this yourself.
1. Check which tables have RLS enabled at all. Open the Supabase SQL editor and run:
select tablename, rowsecurity
from pg_tables
where schemaname = 'public';
Any row showing rowsecurity = false is a table your public anon key can read or write with zero restrictions. That's step one, and for a lot of vibe-coded apps, it's the whole problem.
2. Don't stop at "RLS is on." Enabling RLS with no policies attached locks a table down completely, which breaks your app. So a lot of Lovable-generated code adds a policy just to make things work again. If that policy reads USING (true) for the anon role, you've re-opened the door you just closed. Check the actual policy logic in Database > Policies, not just whether a policy exists.
3. Test it like an attacker would. Grab your anon key from the browser network tab (it's meant to be public, that part's fine) and hit your REST endpoint directly with curl, logged out:
curl 'https://YOUR_PROJECT.supabase.co/rest/v1/your_table?select=*' \
-H 'apikey: YOUR_ANON_KEY'
If you get back rows that aren't yours, you have the exact issue Crissy Field documented.
4. Check storage buckets separately. RLS policies on tables don't cover Supabase Storage. Public buckets holding ID scans, invoices, or uploaded photos have shown up in earlier Lovable incidents too, and they need their own access rules.
5. For new projects, confirm the October 30 default is active. If your project predates that rollout, don't assume you're covered: check grants on every table you already shipped.
Lock down the table immediately with a policy scoped to the authenticated user (auth.uid() = user_id is the standard pattern), then audit what was actually exposed and for how long. If the data includes anything regulated (passports, payment details, health info), you likely have a notification obligation depending on your jurisdiction, so don't just quietly patch it and move on.
This is the same instinct that matters whenever a tool defaults to "convenient" over "locked down": we've seen it with leaked local settings files and with credentials left in exposed configs after a breach. The fix is almost always the same: rotate what might be compromised, then go verify the default you trusted actually does what you assumed.
If you're shipping anything with a vibe-coding tool and you haven't opened your Supabase dashboard in the last month, today's the day. Ten minutes now beats being the next line item in somebody's research spreadsheet.
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